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Crime is on the rise in cyberspace, and it is
threatening the economic and social institutions
that have begun to settle there. Cybercrime is
quick to occur and difficult to prosecute.' Net-
work intrusions and "hacks" can take place in a
matter of seconds with complete anonymity. And
those that do leave criminal trails do so through a
maze of computer infrastructure, often far be-
yond the reach of a nation's laws.
Several Western nations have come together in
an attempt to deter hackers and limit cyber at-
tacks. The Council of Europe ("CoE") along with
the U.S. Department ofJustice ("DOJ") have been
actively meeting since 1997 in the drafting of an
international treaty whereby signatory countries
are required to create and strengthen their do-
mestic laws. This treaty in effect will create new
cybercrimes, extend the interception and surveil-
lance abilities of law enforcement and coordinate
such enforcement so that authorities can commu-
nicate with one another and exchange informa-
tion when investigating cyber "incidents." And
given the unique nature of the Internet, increased
power over surveillance and data interception
may lead to intrusions into the personal lives of
those that utilize and maintain that technology.
This comment serves as a critique of the inter-
national cybercrime treaty, from its shrouded ori-
gins to its final draft. First, this comment will
briefly explore the exigencies of cybercrime that
I See Martin Stone, Cybercrime Growing Harder to Prosecute -
Report, NEWSBYTES, at http://www.infowar.com/law/00/
law_012400aj.shtml (Jan. 21, 2000).
2 Steve Gold, Security Breaches Cost $15 Bil. Yearly, NEW-
SBsrEs, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/158197.html
(Nov. 15, 2000). E-security white paper and allied report is
available at E-Security: Removing the Roadblock to E-Business, THE
DATAMONITOR GROUP, at http://www.datamonitor.com.
There is a charge to access copies of this report.
3 Michelle Delio, The Greatest Hacks of All Time, WIRED
NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41630,
00.html (Feb. 6, 2001).
4 Internet Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Science,
Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
have stirred Western nations into a state of alarm.
Second, it will explore the origins and early drafts
of the treaty. Third, it will scrutinize the language
of the treaty, examining its criminal law impact on
cyberspace. Finally, this comment concludes that
cybercrime's state of alarm is privacy's state of
emergency and that the U.S. should not sign the
present treaty as drafted.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL EXIGENCY OF
CYBERCRIME
Globally, the amount of damages from network
intrusions causes more than $15 billion in dam-
ages annually.2 From hacks into credit card com-
panies to identity theft to terrorism 3 such attacks
have become so common that the newspaper
headlines do not generally report these intrusions
as primetime news. 4 Many of these attacks go un-
reported as companies fear negative publicity and
lack confidence in their information practices.
5
In 2000, the United States alone accounted for
over $20 billion in e-commerce retail revenues.
6
Large amounts of online transactions have inevi-
tably become a target for criminal activities. Con-
gress has taken a number of statements from vari-
ous law enforcement officials concerning the
growth of cybercrime. The FBI reported opening
547 computer intrusion cases in 1998 that had
and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Bruce
Schneier, Chief Technical Officer of Counterpane Internet
Security, Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/
hearings/071601Schneier.pdf (last visited July 24, 2002).
5 Sylvia Dennis, Internet Fraud Escalating in UK, Says Exper-
ian, NEWSBYTES, at http://www.infowar.com/survey/00/sur-
vey_091500a j.shtml (Sept. 14, 2000); see also Council of Eu-
rope, CYBER-CRIME - THE TARGET IT HITS, THE DAMAGE IT
DOES, at http://press.coe.int/press2/press.asp?B=
54,0,0,107,0&M=http://press.coe.int/dossiers/1 07/E/e-
cibles.htm (last modified Sept. 17, 2001).
6 U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, Department of Commerce, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE NEWS, at http://www.census.gov/mrts/
www/current.html (Aug. 30, 2001).
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
doubled by 1999. 7 The agency stated that al-
though it had closed several of these cases, threats
were growing at disproportionate rates.8 Broad
spectrums of groups are posing serious threats to
the Internet, including so-called "insiders, '"" hack-
ers, virus writers, terrorists and other criminal
groups.10
The United States has been hailed a "major im-
porter of crime""II due to the large amount of bus-
iness transactions that occur within it its borders
and its increasing reliance on the Internet as plat-
form for commerce. U.S. law enforcement of-
ficers not only deal with cybercrime in this coun-
try, but have been actively implementing interna-
tional programs that coordinate access to infor-
mation with other national law enforcement
groups and train other international law enforce-
ment officers to combat international crime.
Thousands of foreign law enforcement officers
from over forty countries are trained by U.S. of-
ficers. 12 Such initiatives train foreign officers in
computer related skills, such as tracking and sur-
veillance methods.
The U.S. has strict enforcement techniques, in-
cluding customs programs and national monitor-
ing of communications traffic due to the large
7 Cybercrime: Before the Subcomm. for the Dept's of Commerce,
Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate
Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter
Freeh Statement on Cybercrime] (statement of LouisJ. Freeh, Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congressOO/
cyber021600.htm (last visited July 24, 2002). The FBI re-
ported that 1154 cases had been opened in 1999. These
figures do not include crimes such as Internet fraud or on-
line child pornography.
8 See generally Marc C. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care
about Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465 (1997) (stat-
ing five reasons as to how and why police have problems con-
fronting and investigating cybercrime: cybercrime is outside
the job description, difficulty of policing the Internet, lack of
resources, police need additional technical help and a lack of
public outcry); id. at 477-490. The author states that these
institutional factors deter the police from even investigating
cybercrime. Id. at 494.
9 These cases involve unauthorized access by disgruntled
employees with inside information on their company.
10 Cybercrime: Before a Special Field Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov't Info. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciay, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement for the Record of
Guadalupe Gonzalez, Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at http:/
/www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congressOO/
gonza042100.htm. An example of this category is an interna-
tional group who penetrated the computer systems of MCI,
Sprint, AT&T, Equifax and the National Crime Information
Center of the FBI. Convictions were based on the theft of
thousands of Sprint calling card numbers.
amount hacking attempts that originate outside
the country. Because of the continued growth of
international crime, the FBI has established sev-
eral programs designed to initiate and empower
enforcement efforts.13 The FBI, though, is not the
only executive entity active about cybercrime.
Criminal misuse of computers has also affected
government systems. The Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") reported that the major challenge
concerning cybercrime is to "find ways to defend
our infrastructure and protect our commerce
while maintaining an open society." 14 A recent in-
cident occurred where U.S. military systems were
subjected to an "electronic assault" termed Solar
Sunrise. Two teenage hackers in California
hacked into U.S. military systems while under the
direction of a teenage hacker in Israel. The in-
truders went undetected at first as they hid their
"tracks" through networks of routers and servers.
Computer crime affecting commercial and mili-
tary computer systems has not gone unnoticed.
Hacking and network intrusions have spawned an
international effort in the U.S. and other Western
nations to implement model laws outlawing com-
puter misconduct. With extensive help from the
11 See The Threat of International Crime and Global Terrorism
and the International Law Enforcement Programs of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation: Before the House Int'l Relations Comm.,
105th Cong. (1997) (statement of LouisJ. Freeh, Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation), [hereinafter Freeh State-
ment on International Crime], available at http://www.fbi.gov/
pressrm/congress/congress97/initiatives-int.htm.
12 Id.
13 International Crime: Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Opera-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement for the record of Louis J. Freeh, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at http://
www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/congress98/intrcrime.htm.
First, the FBI must have an active overseas presence that
fosters the establishment of effective working relation-
ships with foreign law enforcement agencies ... Second,
training foreign law enforcement officers in both basic
and advanced investigative techniques and principles is a
powerful tool for promoting cooperation . . .Third, in-
stitution building is necessary to help establish and fos-
ter the rule of law in newly democratic republics. Id.
14 Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy: Before the Joint Econ.
Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement by John A. Serabian,
Jr., Information Operations Issue Manager for the Central
Intelligence Agency), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
public -affairs/speeches/archives/2000/cyberth reats_
022300.html. The statement covered four threats: foreign en-
tities could perform cyber reconnaissance of U.S. computers;
an attacker could conceal points of origin by hopping
through several intermediate way stations in cyberspace; an
attacker could conceal his origin and erase cyber footprints
from victim computers; cyber tools are readily available.
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U.S., Europe has been actively discussing and has
drafted a treaty that would do just that.
II. HISTORY OF THE DRAFT TREATY
A. The Rise of International Law
European discussions of cybercrime have been
ongoing for several years. Although the general
public may have had trouble obtaining such infor-
mation, European directives have provided some
indication that national legislation in the Commu-
nity was beginning to address its share of the
growing problem. The Council of Europe
15
("CoE") has been the leading multi-lateral organi-
zation concerned with cybercrime thus far. In
1989, the CoE's Committee of Ministers'
6
adopted Recommendation No. R. (89) 9 stating
that Member States need to consider computer-
related crime when reviewing national legisla-
tion. 17 The Recommendation also listed imple-
mentation guidelines for legislators that would
criminalize certain criminal acts. Procedural poli-
cies were subsequently drafted in 1995. Recom-
mendation No. R. (95) 13 was adopted to provide
15 The CoE is a "multinational organization that includes
both European Union member states and several non-demo-
cratic countries." Comments of NetCoalition.com, The Cyber-
crime Convention Will Harm U.S. Internet Users and Business,
NETCOALITION [hereinafter Comments of NetCoalition], at
http://www.cdt.org/international/cybercrime/
010100netcoalition.shtml (Jan. 2001). The Council of Eu-
rope consists of 43 member states. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S MEMBER STATES, at http://www.coe.
int/portal.asp?strScreenType=100&L=E&M=$t/1-1-1-1//por-
tal.asp?L=E&M=$t/001-00-00-2/02/EMB,1,0,0,2,Map.stm
(last modified Sept. 17, 2001) (listing Member States and the
year these states joined the CoE). It was established in 1949
as an organization dedicated to strengthening human rights
by promoting democracy and the rule of law in Europe. The
U.S. Department ofJustice notes that it is the negotiating fo-
rum for conventions on criminal issues. DEPARTMENT OFJUS-
TICE, Frequently Asked Questions and Answers About the Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Draft 24REV2), at http://www.
usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/COEFAQs.htm (last up-
dated Dec. 1, 2000). Although the United States is not a
member, it does maintain "observer" status at CoE delibera-
tions. Id. For more information, see generally the CoE's website
at http://www.coe.int.
16 The Committee of Ministers is the decision-making
body of the Council of Europe. The Committee is also re-
sponsible for directly representing the governments of the
member States. See Council of Europe, Introduction to the Com-
mittee of Ministers, at http://cm.coe.int/intro/intro.O.html.
The Council of Ministers "is the main source of EU legisla-
tion." FIONA HAYES-RENSHAW& HELEN WALLACE, THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS 1 (1997).
17 Recommendation No. R. (89) 9 Of the Committee of
procedures for criminal law concerning issues
such as search and seizure, surveillance and inter-
national cooperation.18
Although the Council issued specific recom-
mendations, no formal process had been initiated
that would coordinate the laws of member Euro-
pean states. But in 1997, a Committee of Experts
on Crime in Cyber-Space (PC-CY) 19 was formed to
examine problems related to computer crime and
to implement criminal procedures dealing with
this new and growing form of crime. 20 The PC-CY
was to use the previous two recommendations as a
foundation for examining the growing threat of
computer crime and the appropriate legal struc-
ture to implement. PC-CY was charged with draft-
ing "a binding legal document" that would even-
tually evolve into the present-day cybercrime
treaty. The PC-CY's legal conclusions addressed
five issues: cyber offenses through telecommuni-
cation networks, harmonization of substantive
criminal law,21 the investigative powers of law en-
forcement, conflict of laws issues and questions of
international cooperation.2 2 The terms of refer-
ence specified that participating countries ap-
point expert members,23 and also provided the
Ministers to Member States on Computer-related Crime,
1989, available at http://www.cm.coe.int/ta/rec/1989/
89r9.htm [hereinafter Recommendation No. R (89)].
18 Recommendation No. R. (95) 13 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States Concerning Problems of Crimi-
nal Procedure Law Connected with Information Technology,
1995, available at http://www.coe.fr/cm/ta/rec/1995/
95r13.htm [hereinafter Recommendation No. R. (95)]. The
Recommendation also implemented procedures for elec-
tronic evidence, use of encryption, cooperation obligations
and research, statistics and training.
19 The Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyber-Space
(PC-CY) is a form of "subcommittee" housed in the CoE's
European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC).
20 Specific Terms of Reference of the Committee of Experts on
Crime in Cyber-Space, Council of Europe's Fight Against Cor-
ruption and Organised Crime, §4(a)-(b), 583rd Meeting
[hereinafter Specific Terms of Reference], available at http://
www.cm.coe.int/dec/1997/583/583.a13.html (Feb. 4, 1997).
The terms of reference are the recommendations and re-
ports that PC-CY was to build upon when reviewing problems
of computer-related crime.
21 The issues under this subject involved international
cooperation approaches relating to "definition, sanctions
and responsibility of the actors in cyber-space, including In-
ternet service providers." Id. at §4(c) (ii).
22 Id. at §4(c) (iv) and (v). The PC-CY did not give exam-
ples of international cooperation, but such efforts would in-
clude coordination of intergovernmental enforcement agen-
cies, the international interconnection of police computer
databanks and 24/7 cybercrime hotlines. See generally Freeh
Statement on International Crime, supra note 11.
23 Membership of the Committee included "one expert
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"desired" qualifications to look for in the process
of appointing these experts. 24 In addition, the
U.S., Canada and Japan had been named as "ob-
server" countries. The observers may send a repre-
sentative, but do not have the right to vote. 25
These terms of reference were to expire originally
on December 31, 1999,26 but were later extended
to December 2000.
Most of this information was minimally availa-
ble to the general public. 27 At most, one could
find an occasional passing reference to the PC-CY
in European government materials.28 The CoE's
press release in February 1997 called for a legally
binding document to be drafted in which the PC-
CY met in relative obscurity up until the early
months of 2000. At this time, USENET groups be-
gan to report that a cybercrime treaty was in the
works.
In the early weeks of the new millennium,
appointed by the government of the following member
states: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Sweden, 'the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia,' as
well as two scientific experts appointed by the Secretariat."
Id. at §5 (a).
24 The qualifications included "prosecutors or judges
dealing with computer crime cases, experts in the field of
substantive and procedural law aspects of computer crime,
experts having carried out research in this field; persons ap-
pointed should also have international experience and suffi-
cient knowledge of the technical aspects of computer crime.
Members of previous Council of Europe expert committees
on computer-related crime would be preferable." Id. at §5(c).
25 The observer countries were also required to pay their
own expenses. Except for the Netherlands and Portugal, the
participating countries could defray costs. Id. at §5(b), (d).
26 Some sources, though, reported that PC-CY was to
complete the document by the end of 2000 and not 1999. See,
e.g., Michael A. Sussmann, The Citical Challenges from Interna-
tional High-Tech and Computer-Related Crime at the Millennium, 9
DuEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 451, 478 (1999).
27 In general, it is the policy of the CoE to not release
drafts while negotiations are ongoing. It is not until negotia-
tions have begun to close that the text of a draft treaty would
normally be released. Interview with John Lynch, U.S. Attor-
ney, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S.
Department of Justice (Mar. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Interview
with John Lynch]. In this case, the text of the draft treaty has
only been released online.
28 Specific Terms of Reference, supra note 20. It is the policy
of the CoE to conduct its meetings in private. Rules of Proce-
dure of the Council, art. 4(1), 1996 O.J. (Dec. 10, 1996).
29 Webopedia, an online encyclopedia, defines a USENET
as "[a] worldwide bulletin board system that can be accessed
through the Internet or through many online services. The
USENET contains more than 14,000 forums, called new-
sgroups, that cover every imaginable interest group. It is used
daily by millions of people around the world." WEBOPEDIA,
INTERNE-r.cOM, at http://webopedia.internet.com/TERM/
U/USENET.html.
USENET29 reports began circulating that Euro-
pean officials had been meeting in secret to dis-
cuss the drafting of a world cybercrime treaty.
30
Although the reports were not yet being posted by
the more traditional sources of Internet news,
3 1
the word was that European officials had been
holding discussions "that would try and ban hack-
ing and Internet eavesdropping utilities." 32 It was
reported that the U.S. government, along with Ja-
pan, Canada and South Africa, had been partici-
pating in the talks. The primary source for the
USENET reports was a letter from the Dutch Min-
ister of Justice written to the Dutch Parliament,
which mentioned basic details of the treaty discus-
sions and its objectives for increased eavesdrop-
ping and surveillance of the Internet.
33
These early reports were generally uncon-
firmed, with European press officers declining to
"I" Steve Gold, World Cybercrime Treaty May Be Underway,
NEWSBYTES, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/
142185.html (Jan. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Gold]. The article
stated that reports of the treaty had been circulating on a
Dutch USENET, which may be viewed at http://www.bof.nl.
A user of landfield.com posted a similar article in the news
archives of Internet Security News. [ISN] US-Europe Cybercrime
Treaty Happening in Secret, LANDFIELD.COM, at http://www.
landfield.com/isn/mail-archive/2000/Jan/0019.html (Jan.
13, 2000). Internet Security News is a part of Land-
field.com's USENET service where users can post informa-
tion related to the specific subject matter.
31 I refer to traditional sources of Internet news as
CNN.com, ABCnews.com, WashingtonPost.com, etc.
32 Gold, supra note 30. Many news websites began using
the USENET post and the Newsbytes article as their sources
for their own reports on the treaty discussions.
33 Press Release, Dutch Minister ofJustice, Crime in Cyber-
space Convention: International Measures to Tackle Internet Crime,
at http://www.minjust.nl:8080/c-actual/persber/
pb0549.htm (Dec. 24, 1999) [hereinafter First Draft Press Re-
lease]. The letter was stated to have been translated from
Dutch to English and then posted on the USENET group.
Interested parties may find an English translation of the let-
ter at the above website. M. Wessling, US-Europe Cybercrime
Treaty Happening in Secret, F OLIrECHBOT.COM, at http://www.
politechbot.com/p-00849.html (Jan. 13, 2000) [hereinafter
Wessling]. The author of the post translated and discussed
the context of the Dutch letter.
Protection against so-called CIA-crimes (confidentiality,
integrity and availability) of public and closed networks
and systems: computer hacking, unauthorized eaves-
dropping, unauthorized changing or destroying of data
(either stored or in transport). In discussion are also de-
nial of service attacks to public and private networks and
systems. This will probably not cover spam. The treaty
will outlaw the production, making available or distribu-
tion of hardware and software tools to do the above-
mentioned (hacking, denial of service, eavesdropping,
etc.). The letter does not mention the possession of
these tools. Id.
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comment on the subject. 34 One source did state
that a draft treaty would need considerable public
debate and that all countries would need to be in
agreement before becoming signatories. 35 Cyber-
crime enforcement had been underway for sev-
eral years, and the CoE was answering any specific
questions concerning the draft convention or a
possible treaty.
36
In April of 2000, a "first" draft3 7 of the treaty
was finally made available to the public as well as a
press release 38 that described the basic legal ele-
ments and philosophies behind the draft conven-
tion.39 The press release officially declassified the
draft convention and called for "businesses and
associations" to comment "before the final adop-
tion of the text."40 It also stated that the CoE was
focusing on the harmonization and the imple-
mentation of procedural and substantive criminal
law with regards to cybercrime. One of the main
goals was the coordination and cooperation of in-
ternational law enforcement. The U.S., Canada,
South Africa and Japan were named as actively
participating in the treaty negotiations.
41
34 Gold, supra note 30.
35 Id.
36 Id. A law journal article by Michael Sussman, attorney
with the DOJ, references a telephone interview with the
Counselor for Criminal Justice Matters with the European
Union concerning the draft convention. See Michael A. Suss-
mann, The Critical Challenges from International High-Tech and
Computer-Related Crime at the Millennium, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 451, 459 n.29, 478 n. 103 (1999).
37 The press release called the draft treaty the "[flirst
draft of international convention released for public discus-
sion." While this was the first draft released to the public, the
draft treaty was in its 19th revision. First Draft Press Release,
supra note 33.
38 Early news reports on the treaty had mistakenly re-
ported the European Union as negotiating the treaty. The
European Union is a distinct entity separate from the CoE.
See EUROPEAN UNION, THE ABC OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, at
http://europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2001).
39 First Draft Press Release, supra note 33.
40 Id.
41 These countries are named as "observers" and may
participate, but may not have a vote in the PC-CY. Id. at
§5(e).
42 Interview with John Lynch, supra note 27.
43 Janet Reno, Speech Before the High Technology
Crime Investigation Association 1999 International Training
Conference, at http://www.cybercrime.gov/agsandie.htm
(Sept. 20, 1999).
44 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES-
TIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVEN-
TION ON CYBERCRIME (DRAFT24REV2), at http://www.usdoj.
gov/criminal/cybercrime/newCOEFAQs.html (July 10,
2001) (alteration in original). The Department of Justice
An official of the U.S. DOJ mentioned the
treaty as early as February 1999,42 and then Attor-
ney General Janet Reno also made a passing refer-
ence in September 1999, but in reference to
trans-border searches. 43 In December 2000, the
U.S. DOJ officially acknowledged on its website
that it had been participating in the negotiations
of the draft convention for a few years prior to the
first public draft and stated that it "has had a real
voice in the [current] drafting process." 44 The
President of Silicon Defense, Stuart Staniford,
while appearing on a panel about the draft treaty
at the European Computer Security Conference,
stated that even though the U.S. is an observer at
the CoE, it "has apparently been heavily involved
in the drafting."45
While the first public release of the draft treaty
was in its 19th version,46 several drafts have subse-
quently been released. In June 2001, the final
draft was approved by the European Committee
on Crime Problems. 47 It has since been finalized
by the Committee of Ministers and opened up for
signature.
48
hosts this web page answering some "frequently asked ques-
tions" regarding the CoE Convention on Cybercrime. The
DOJ stated that it had been invited to participate as an "ob-
server" in the development of the Convention. The DOJ has
a history of being an "observer," both times in the Recom-
mendations addressing the need for laws concerning crime
over computer networks published in 1989 and again in
1995. Id.
45 Stuart Saniford, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures:
The Key to Information Sharing, Panel on Cybercrime Treaty, at
http://www.cve.mitre.org/board/archives/2000-10/
msg0007.html (Oct. 5, 2000) [hereinafter Saniford]. CVE is
a collaborative effort including "representatives from numer-
ous security-related organizations such as security tool ven-
dors, academic institutions, and government as well as other
prominent security experts," which "aims to standardize the
names of all publicly known vulnerabilities and security expo-
sures." COMMON VULNERABILITIES AND EXPOSURES, ABOUT
CVE, at http://www.cve.mitre.org/about Uan. 22, 2001).
46 EUROPEAN COMM. ON CRIME PROBLEMS, DRAFT CONVEN-
TION ON CYBER-CRIME (DRAFT No. 19) OP THE COMMITrEE OF
EXPERTS ON CRIME IN CYBER-SPACE, at http://conven-
tions.coe.int/treaty/en/projets/cybercrime.htm (Apr. 25,
2000) [hereinafter Cybercrime Treaty Draft 19].
47 EUROPEAN COMM. ON CRIME PROBLEMS, DRAFT CONVEN-
TION ON CYBER-CRIME OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON
CRIME IN CYBER-SPACE, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
EN/projets/FinalCybercrime.htm (June 29, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft]. Drafts No. 19 through 24 can
also be accessed through the CoE website.
48 Committee of Ministers, Convention on Cybercrime ETS
no.: 185, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
WhatYouWant.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=12/12/01 (last vis-
ited Dec. 23, 2001).
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III. THE TREATY EXPLAINED
Since its initial release in April 2000, the treaty
has been revised several times in response to
much criticism over its language and the potential
problems with its procedural implementation.
Groups have called the treaty "alarming and quite
disturbing,"49 with criticism stemming from the
U.S. and within Europe. Many organizations have
come together to protest and comment on the
treaty's backseat treatment of privacy rights. 50 The
following analysis will show that these apprehen-
sions are rightfully appropriate.
A. The Preamble
The treaty contains 48 articles,51 categorized
under lengthy chapters, tides and subsections. Its
beginning starts with a preamble stating the docu-
ment's intent. The intent is to foster a "common
criminal policy aimed at the protection of society
against cyber-crime." 52 To foster protection, it
promotes cooperation between governments and
industry. As cybercrime can happen abruptly and
without detection, the drafters find it crucial that
law enforcement be able to mobilize swiftly and
efficiently. This would require "increased, rapid,
and well-functioning international co-operation"
49 Jason Wallace, Council of Europe Cybercrme Treaty Analy-
sis, at http://www.ithell.com/Opinion/Cybercrime Treaty/
body-cybercrime-treaty.html (November 2, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Wallace]. The author argues that the vague nature of the
treaty will trammel civil rights and that privacy procedures
should be of first concern. Id. Ithell.com hails itself as
"Where IT Professionals Vent!"
50 See, eg., CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, COM-
MENTS OF THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY ON
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE DRAr "CONVENTION ON CYBER-
CRIME" (DRAFT No. 25), at http://www.cdt.org/interna-
tional/cybercrime/010206cdt.shtml (Feb. 6, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter CDT Comments]. STATEMENT OF CONCERNS, TREAT)( LETTER
BY INDIVIDUAL SIGNERS, at http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/
homes/spaf/coe/TREATYLETI'ER.html; see also SIGNERS OF
THE CONCERNS LETTER, at http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/
homes/spaf/coe/TREATY SIGNATURES.html; GLOBAL IN-
TERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN, GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAM-
PAIGN MEMBER LETTER ON COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION
ON CYBER-CRIME, at http://www.gilc.org/privacy/coe-letter-
1200.html (Oct. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Global Internet Liberty
Campaign]. These organizations are just a few of the many
groups against the current draft treaty.
51 For this paper, all references to a particular section of
the treaty will be by article number.
52 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at preamble.
53 Id.
54 Convinced that the present Convention is necessary to
deter actions directed against the confidentiality, integrity
and availability of computer systems, networks and computer
against cybercrime. 53 Other elements of the treaty
address deterrence as a necessary function of the
draft convention. 54 The preamble states that facil-
itation of "detection, investigation and prosecu-
tion" will protect the "confidentiality, integrity
and availability of computer systems."
While the primary themes of the treaty focus on
the prevention of criminal acts and the coordina-
tion of international law enforcement, a large part
of the preamble attempts to devote a theme to the
issue of "fundamental human rights." 55 "Mindful"
of the rights of individuals, the draft treaty states
that it balances this against the interests of law en-
forcement. The preamble "enshrines" itself within
the major international human rights documents
drafted by the Council of Europe.5 6 Unfortu-
nately, this rhetoric of rights ends as quickly as it
begins. It should be noted that the first release of
the public draft failed to mention the need for in-
dividual rights. 57 The provisions dealing with
rights have only come about in subsequent drafts
showing, quite possibly, that human rights were
never of importance to the committee drafters.
More examples of law enforcement's truncated
balance are evident with a reading of the terms of
reference, listed toward the end of the preamble.
The original terms of reference, as explained ear-
data, as well as the misuse of such systems, networks and data,
by providing for the criminalisation of such conduct, as de-
scribed in this Convention, and the adoption of powers suffi-
cient for effectively combating such criminal offences, by fa-
cilitating the detection, investigation and prosecution of such
criminal offences at both the domestic and international
level, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable in-
ternational cooperation. Id.
55 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at preamble.
56 The preamble lists the applicable human rights docu-
ments that the draft treaty is "enshrined" within. These in-
clude: the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the
1966 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights; the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the
Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Process-
ing of Personal Data; the 1989 United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child; and the 1999 International La-
bour Organization Worst Forms of Child Labour Conven-
tion. Id. Much of the draft treaty's rhetoric may pay lip ser-
vice to these great documents, but nowhere does the draft
treaty specifically answer how the principles of these great
documents are incorporated on a practical level. This as-
sumption of my analysis may be naive, but a draft treaty that
articulates the practical concerns of law enforcement, yet
only crafts theoretical notions of human rights with abso-
lutely no practical implementation of such should be
deemed as "hollow rhetoric." Id. at art. 15.
57 Cybercrime Treaty Draft 19, supra note 46.
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lier, included Recommendations No. R. (89) 9
and No. R. (95) 13, which dealt with guidelines
for considering computer crime and related
problems in criminal procedure law, respec-
tively.58 Additional Recommendations have been
added, including those dealing with the intercep-
tion of telecommunications, 59 copyright infringe-
ment and piracy6° and "regulating the use of per-
sonal data in the police sector."6 1 While these sub-
jects were to be examined by the committee, 62 ad-
ditional recommendations concerning law en-
forcement have been added by the committee,
thereby loading the language of the draft treaty
with enforcement references.
B. Language of the Treaty
The preamble states the general philosophical
foundations of the treaty. A working paper written
by the Center for Democracy and Technology
states that the draft is actually "a combination of
three treaties. '63 First, signatory countries must
implement substantive criminal provisions to
unify the scattered state of Western cyber laws.
Second, unilateral procedures must be adopted
that allow for increased government power in
cyber-criminal investigations. Finally, the treaty re-
quires the institution of international cooperation
efforts in collecting evidence and intercepting
communications.
The treaty is composed of four main chapters.
Chapter one deals with the use of terms and defi-
nitions. Chapter two calls for substantive and pro-
58 Recommendation No. R. (89), supra note 17. Recom-
mendation No. R. (95), supra note 18.
59 Recommendation No. R. (85) 10 of the Committee of
Ministers Concerning the Practical Application of the Euro-
pean Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
in Respect of Letters Rogatory for the Interception of Tele-
communications, available at http://cm.coe.int/ta/rec/
1985/85r10.htm (June 28, 1985).
60 Recommendation No. R. (88) 2 of the Committee of
Ministers on Measures to Combat Piracy in the Field of Copy-
right and Neighbouring Rights, available at http://
cm.coe.int/ta/rec/1988/88r2.htm (Jan. 18, 1988).
61 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at pream-
ble.
62 '1 Specific Terms of Reference, supra note 20.
63 CDT Comments, supra note 50.
64 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at arts. 2-6.
65 Id. at arts. 7-8.
66 Id. at art. 9.
67 Id. at art. 10. The discussion on copyright will not be
developed because it is outside the scope of privacy rights
cedural measures to be implemented at the na-
tional level. Chapter three concerns international
cooperation efforts, with chapter four left for the
final provisions and other miscellaneous treaty
components.
Chapter two is split into two sections that deal
with the specific laws and procedures to be en-
acted by each signatory country through its do-
mestic laws. Section one of the chapter covers sub-
stantive criminal law while section two examines
measures at the procedural level.
The most controversial arguments against the
treaty concern the debate over what sort of laws
will be enacted domestically. This section has pro-
duced some of the most fervor because it allows
countries to enact new criminal regulations with-
out guidance or prediction as to how these regula-
tions will impact the general population of com-
puter users.
Articles 2 through 10 discuss the first aspect of
the treaty: the enactment of substantive criminal
laws, broken up into five titles. The first four deal
with types of criminal offences: (1) those against
the "confidentiality, integrity and availability of
computer data and systems, ' 64 (2) "computer-re-
lated offences", 65 (3) "content-related offences ''66
and (4) "copyright offences." 67 Tide five covers
ancillary liability and sanctions.
These nine articles appear as an entire treaty in
themselves. 6 Although nine offenses are listed,
the draft convention actually enacts only four new
cybercrimes 69 and mandates that new and addi-
tional forgery and fraud laws be added for com-
and is dealt with exclusively under a separate international
treaty. It is the brief opinion of this article that new laws re-
lated to copyright are duplicative, and already quite contro-
versial, and therefore, should be rethought in both a na-
tional and international context. See generally Gaylen Duncan,
Letter Regarding the Draft Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-
Crime, at http://www.cdt.org/international/cybercrime/
001023itac.shtml. CDT Comments, supra note 50 (stating that
intellectual property protection is an extremely complicated
issue that touches upon both free expression and privacy is-
sues and that is still in flux"); Global Internet Liberty Campaign,
supra note 50 (arguing that "new criminal penalties should
not be established by international convention in an area
where national law is so unsettled").
68 CDT Comments, supra note 50 (noting that arts. 2-10
create a criminal law treaty).
69 Articles 2 through 5 include illegal access, illegal inter-
ception, data interference and system interference, respec-
tively. "Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of computer data and systems." Cybercrime Treaty
Final Draft, supra note 58, at title 1.
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puter crime. 70 A separate substantive offense for





McConnell International reported that many
countries do not prohibit cybercrimes. 7 3 Crimes
concerning illegal access, interference and inter-
ception are being slowly implemented and are
sparsely recognized. The treaty would correct this
trend and require enactment of legislation to
help combat cybercrime by allowing the height-
ened enforcement and prosecution of hacking.
a. Article 2 and Illegal Access
Article 2 states that it shall be unlawful to inten-
tionally access in whole or in part another's com-
puter system without right. 74 This provision, in ef-
fect, allows a nation to prosecute those that tam-
per with the means to enter a network or an-
other's computer even if not actually entered. For
example, a hacker that merely accesses a part of
that system, such as a security program that allows
entry, could be charged under a country's laws for
access without right.
An endnote in the treaty defines "without right"
stating that the expression should derive from its
context under principles of the signatory coun-
try's laws. Essentially, (criminal) behavior con-
ducted without the authority to do so. Countries
are permitted to define what is "without right"
based on their abilities to "maintain public order,
protect national security or investigate criminal
offences. '7 5 The Center for Democracy and Tech-
70 Id. at title 2.
71 Id. at art 6. (covering "[o] ffences against the confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability of computer data and sys-
tems").
72 This comment only covers the controversial argu-
ments of Chapter Two, which include illegal access and the
misuse of devices.
73 Cyber Crime... and Punishment? Archaic Laws Threaten
Global Information, MCCONNELL INTERNATIONAL, at http://
www.mcconnellinternational.com/services/CyberCrime.htm
(Dec. 2000) [hereinafter Archaic Laws] (arguing that the
growing danger of cybercrime and the minimal protection
offered by nations mandate that a model approach to law is
needed to promote a secure environment for e-commerce).
74 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at art. 2.
75 Explanatory Memorandum Related Thereto, Eur.
Comm. on Crime Problems, at http://conventions.coe.int/
treaty/en/projets/FinalCyberRapex.htm (June 29, 2001)
[hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum].
nology has argued persuasively against this
endnote saying:
"that what is not permitted is prohibited. In addition,
the treaty would make violations of a service provider's
terms of service into a criminal offense. The ISP sub-
scriber who uses the service for a purpose prohibited by
the terms of service is accessing the computer of the
ISP 'without fight.' The student who uploads or
downloads a single music file in violation of the univer-
sity's policy for granting students Internet access is com-
mitting a crime. If an employer tells its employees that
they cannot use the Internet at work for personal pur-
poses, the employee who logs on and checks a stock
quote is committing an offense. Conversely, even
though the treaty establishes a separate crime of 'illegal
interception,' the phrase 'without right' appears there
also, and would protect the ISP or service provider
whose terms of service reserve the fight to randomly or
systematically read the communications of its subscrib-
ers."
76
One should not be able to access another's
computer system in whole or in part without a
right do so. This is clear. However, this prohibi-
tion involves designating and defining who has
the right to access and who does not. Some "hack-
ers" are genuine security professionals that pos-
sess the right to access and may be performing
"routine Internet functions such as security test-
ing, price comparisons and automatic data collec-
tion."7 7 Therefore, there are concerns over what
sort of access is allowed and what would be prose-
cuted. Does the language of Article 2 allow a na-
tion to outlaw security testing and security tools?
78
The drafters have attempted to clarify this point
in their explanatory memorandum citing specific
types of activity that constitute acceptable access
and those that are unacceptable.7 9 The memoran-
dum attempts to draw a dividing line between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable access. It states that ar-
76 CIJT Comments, supra note 50.
77 Comments of NetCoalition, supra note 15.
78 An early concern was that security testing could be
criminalized. See Wessling, supra note 33 (stating that such
laws for those that test security "will make your job a lot more
difficult," referencing a website forim for security profession-
als). This statement was made when the draft treaty was not
yet released.
79 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 75, at 62.
This question raises larger concerns over whether a govern-
ment should have oversight over this profession by imple-
menting licensing and certification schemes similar to those
that apply to attorneys, physicians or even to hairstylists. See
Stevan D. Mitchell & Elizabeth A. Banker, Private Intrusion Re-
sponse, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 699, 716-719 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Mitchell & Barker] (advocating licensing as "a novel
venue for cooperation and compromise" for both govern-
ment and industry oversight to deal with crimes of intru-
sion).
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ticles 2 through 5 should not be construed to
criminalize common Internet activities and those
activities "inherent in the design of the networks
or common operating or commercial practices."80
Examples of acceptable activities include:
sending electronic mail without it having been first
solicited by the recipient; accessing a web page or ftp
("file transfer protocol") server that has been con-
figured for public access; using hypertext links, includ-
ing deep-links; or employing programs such as "cook-
ies" or "bots" to locate and retrieve information where
such programs can be filtered or rejected by the receiv-
ing server.
8 1
These paragraphs are a good beginning to a clear
set of guidelines, but the treaty soon becomes less
specific with regard to the limitations of law en-
forcement and more specific with which laws
should be enacted.
b. Article 6 and the Misuse of Devices
Controversy surrounds Article 6. Each signatory
country would be required to outlaw the use of
any device used in the commission of the previous
five offenses. That is, one that used a cyber-device
to access or interfere with another's network
would be guilty of misusing the device and guilty
of possession.8 2 Possession or use of computer
passwords or access codes also carries a penalty8 3
for such items are the keys to the virtual door.
This article in effect outlaws the misuse of hack-
ing devices or any devices used to gain access to
another's system. Security analysts responding to
Article 6 fear that such language could be con-
strued as outlawing all attempts of hacking, even
80 Id.
81 Id. at 48.
82 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 58, at art. 6,
sec. 1.
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other mea-
sures as may be necessary to establish as criminal of-
fences under its domestic law when committed inten-
tionally and without right: (a) the production, sale, pro-
curement for use, import, distribution or otherwise mak-
ing available of: (1) a device, including a computer pro-
gram, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of
committing any of the offences established in accor-
dance with Article 2-5; (2) a computer password, access
code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a
computer system is capable of being accessed with intent
that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the
offences established in Articles 2-5; and (b) the posses-
sion of an item referred to in paragraphs (a) (1) or (2)
above, with intent that it be used for the purpose of com-
mitting any of the offences established in Articles 2-5. A
if the purpose is to test for security reasons.8 4
Other critics fear that the article's language has a
potential for over-inclusive definitions as to what
operational methods constitute an illegal misuse
of a device.
Article 6(1) (a) states that one cannot produce,
sell or make available a device designed to com-
mit one of the previous five offenses. The scenario
is that a person could not sell or distribute a de-
vice that could "hack" or be used to help another
device "hack" into an unauthorized and unowned
computer system. Software that could access se-
curity or hardware that can be used to physically
connect to another computer could potentially be
outlawed as a "misuse of a device." A parallel ex-
ample of outlawing the tools of a criminal intru-
sion is a law that forbids the possession or use of a
"Slim Jim" used to open locked vehicles. The key
is that possession, use, sales or any sort of distribu-
tion of such tools would be a criminal act subject
to penalty. Article 6 also applies to the production
and distribution of such tools, including their
manufacture and retail. One would be prohibited
from sharing with another if such device came
under the legal definition of "adapted primarily
for the purpose of committing any of the offences
[previously] established ... "s5
Critics also fear that the vague language of Arti-
cle 6 could lead to the banning of various devices,
prohibiting their positive uses if a nation so de-
sired. The treaty drafters have provided an excep-
tion to help quell these fears, stating that security
analysis will not be outlawed.8 6 As drafted, the
Party may require by law that a number of such items be
possessed before criminal liability attaches. Id.
83 It should be noted that the treaty calls for outlawing
certain cyber activities and does not institute penalization or
sentencing guidelines.
84 See Wessling, supra note 33. See Saniford, supra note 45.
See SLASHDOT GENERAL DISCUSSION, EUROPEAN CYBERCRIME
TREATY 1.1, at http://slashdot.org/yro/00/l1/13/
1828213.shtml (Nov. 13, 2000); see Brian Krebs, Tech Groups
Still Wary of International Cyber-Crime Treaty, NEWSBYrES, at
http://www.computeruser.com/clickit/printout/news/
303039360003353920.html (Dec. 1, 2000).
85 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at art.
6(1)(a)(1). Article 6(1)(b) specifies that a nation may, but
does not have to, make possession with intent a separate of-
fense.
86 Id. at art. 6(2). "This article shall not be interpreted as
imposing criminal liability where the production, sale, pro-
curement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making
available or possession referred to in paragraph 1 of this Arti-
cle is not for the purpose of committing an offence estab-
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treaty states that nothing should be interpreted as
imposing criminal liability on "authorized testing
or protection of a computer system. 8 7 Another
section reserves the right for signatories not to
pass legislation criminalizing the distribution of
offending devices. 88
The underlying problem with this exception is
defining and correctly understanding who has the
right to possess and to use the "tool." The lan-
guage of the treaty suggests that devices used pri-
marily to commit cyber offenses would be banned
from the general public except those used by se-
curity professionals (including law enforcement).
But a counter argument is that security profes-
sionals use these devices primarily to test their own
systems.89 The security professional would be au-
thorized to do this, but access to the device that
helps him or her test the defending system may be
unavailable in the territory of a signatory country.
The problem is that even the most offensive of
hacking devices are used and created by those
that are not authorized to use them.90 Common
household users wishing to protect their systems
privately, but not wanting to intrude upon others,
could face the possibility of not having access to
these devices in defense of their own networks.
Although certain legal scholarship has begun to
opt for licensing measures that would certify those
able to use security tools, 91 those that actually use
the devices are skeptical. A website discussion on
the treaty revealed that many security profession-
als believe that "it simply makes no sense to draft
an international law banning the tools that help
lished in accordance with articles 2 through 5 of this Conven-
tion, such as for the authorised testing or protection of a
computer system.-
87 Id.
88 But, a nation may not reserve the right to exclude de-
vices that make available "a computer password, access code,
or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer
system is capable of being accessed." Id. at art. 6(1) (a) (2). In
essence, a country may criminalize devices designed to com-
mit cyber offences, but must criminalize devices that produce
or distribute passwords or access codes.
89 Wallace, supra note 49.
90 Wallace's example of this is where a company arranges
legitimate hacking efforts where "wargames" are held. "War-
games" invite hackers to crack the company's system to test
that system. Cash rewards are given for successful attempts.
"This could no longer be possible if the tools used in these
wargames were made illegal to the every day user." Id.
91 Mitchell & Barker, supra note 79, at 716-719. This arti-
cle discusses the future of effective cyber crime enforcement
through coordinated efforts of both the public and private
sectors. The authors advocate licensing as "a novel venue for
cooperation and compromise." Id at 732.
us secure systems. Of course, we would love some
more enforcement power to use against potential
crackers, but not if it is a trade off for our tools."
92
Despite this, other commentators argue that gov-
ernments have the right to protect their citizens
against the growing problem of cybercrime.
2. Intrusion, Surveillance and Privacy Rights
Privacy concerns are at their zenith.93 As easily
as technology allows a hacker to intrude upon an-
other's network so too does the treaty permit a
law enforcement officer to use the same technolo-
gies and employ the same methods of intrusion,
but for different purposes. Thus, privacy and pro-
cedural laws are inextricably linked. For instance,
American law once held that wiretapping was not
tantamount to a search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.9 4 The opposite is true to-
day,9 5 but notions of search and seizure, wiretap-
ping and surveillance have become more com-
monplace.9 6
Section 2 of the treaty deals with the procedural
laws to be enacted by each signatory country. The
provisions deal with issues ranging from the scope
and safeguards of the laws to the actual allowance
of search and seizure and data interception.
a. Article 14 and the Scope of Procedure
Article 14 of the draft treaty provides that signa-
tories create or modify their prior procedural laws
for the purpose of "specific criminal investiga-
92 lamsure (web pseudonym), European Cybercrime Treaty
1.1, SLASHDOT, at http://slashdot.org/yro/O0/11/13/
1828213_- F.shtml (Nov. 13, 2000). This posting came from an
unofficial discussion concerning the treaty at Slashdot.org.
Slashdot.org holds itself out as "News for Nerds. Stuff that
matters."
93 See Simon Davies, Re-engineering the Right to Privacy: How
Privacy Has Been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity, in
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 143 (Philip
E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (stating that opinion
polls show that privacy concerns are greater now than any
other time in history).
94 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928)
(stating that a search under the Fourth Amendment was to
be of material things).
95 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967)
(holding that the electronic listening and recording of a con-
versation in a telephone booth constituted a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
96 See INFO-SEC, THE EUROPEAN POLICE STATE, at http://
www.info-sec.com/law/law_- 020298a.html-ssi (1998) (arguing
that Europol not only keeps intelligence files, but stores in-
formation concerning "gossip and slanderous allegations").
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tions''9 7 so that law enforcement officers may util-
ize certain techniques similar to other communi-
cations investigations. Article 14(2) states that
procedures are to apply to three aspects of cyber-
crime: those offenses dealt with in the substantive
portion of the draft,98 other potential cyber-re-
lated crimes not yet specified 9 9 and the electronic
collection of evidence.1 00 In a nutshell, this article
provides a broad scope as to the purpose of the
later procedural provisions.
b. Article 15 and General Safeguards
Article 15101 is also stated broadly, but takes a
rhetorical step in the right direction. This article
functions as a general protection provision stating
that all implementation and procedures listed
under Section 2 are safeguarded "with due regard
for the adequate protection of human
rights... as provided in applicable international
human rights instruments." 10 2 Enactment of do-
mestic laws under the treaty should align with the
letter of other prior treaties protecting civil and
criminal rights.
The language used in this article appears to
protect certain rights, but what particular proce-
97 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at art. 14(1).
("Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to establish the powers and procedures
provided for in this Section for the purpose of specific crimi-
nal investigations or proceedings.").
98 Id. at art. 14(2)(a).
99 Id. at art. 14(2)(b).
100 Id. at art. 14(2)(c).
101 Id. at art. 15 ("Conditions and Safeguards").
Each Party shall ensure the establishment, implementa-
tion and application of the powers and procedures pro-
vided for in this Section are subject to the conditions
and safeguards provided for under its domestic law,
which shall provide for the adequate protection of
human rights and liberties, including rights arising pur-
suant to obligations it has undertaken under the 1950
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1966
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, and other applicable international human
rights instruments, and which shall incorporate the prin-
ciple of proportionality. Id.
102 Footnote 29 in the text specifies the international in-
struments as the 1950 European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its
Protocols and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 75, at
145.
103 There is also nothing explicit in the preamble to clar-
ify these safeguards. Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note
47, at preamble.
104 EUROPEAN COMM. ON CRIME PROBLEMS, FINAL AcTIv-
dures are needed to safeguard human rights?103
Here, the draft treaty does not specify and ap-
pears cursory and indifferent. Nations are man-
dated to enact specific procedural provisions, but
are only generally instructed as how to balance
such procedures against issues of privacy.104 What
if a signatory has a poor record of privacy protec-
tion?105 Are they now to enact new criminal pro-
cedure legislation without revising outdated pri-
vacy techniques? If so, then Article 15 is out of
alignment with the "proper balance between the
interests of law enforcement and human
rights"'1 6 for a signatory can specify what law en-
forcement may do, but it does not need to specify
what law enforcement may not do.
10 7
Article 15108 states that the 1950 European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and the 1966 Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are
to be reflected in any procedural legislation. Pri-
vacy, though, is not mentioned in the first interna-
tional treaty and is scantily referenced in the lat-
ter.109 A "General Comment" to the privacy refer-
ence states that privacy measures require that na-
tional legislation be enacted to prohibit procedu-
rTY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
ON CRIME IN- CYBER-SPACE, at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/projects/FinalCybercrime.htm (June 29, 2001)
[hereinafter FINAL AcTiTv REPORT]. Paragraph 145 of the
Final Activity Report declares that while signatory countries
shall establish procedural safeguards protecting civil rights,
each country is free to implement such rights according to its
laws and procedure. Id. at 145. This provision allows for
countries not to implement such rights according to its "do-
mestic law and procedures of each Party."
105 Amnesty International, an organization dedicated to
promoting international human rights, has reported that po-
lice abuse is common in many European countries, including
the United Kingdom, France, Bulgaria and Moldova. EU-
ROPE - HIGHLIGHTS OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
2000, at http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf/
reg/0f2a063182768575802568f2005a59da.
106 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at pream-
ble.
107 Only one safeguard is specified. Signatories are given
the option of weighing the economic impacts of burdening
innocent third parties before intrusive procedures imple-
mented. Id. at n.30, art 15. This footnote merely states that a
country may consider such an impact, but a nation is not re-
quired to do so.
108 FINAL ACTIVITY REPORT, supra note 104, at 145.
109 "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspon-
dence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputa-
tion." 1966 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITI-




ral abuse." 0 While this Comment may provide a
signatory some direction in which to enact proce-
dural safeguards, the treaty makes only passing
reference to such an important protection for it
does not specifically state what privacy rights are.
Article 15's concern for safeguarding human
rights was never a consideration in the original
public release of the draft treaty as it was not men-
tioned until public outcry surfaced." I And al-
though the drafters have now included privacy as
a concern, the "experts" are still unable to agree
on an acceptable standard because European case
law concerning privacy varies." 2 In other words,
experts representing over forty countries, includ-
ing the U.S. DOJ, can agree upon a cybercrime
enforcement standard, but cannot and will not
agree upon a standard of enforcement for pri-
vacy. 11
3
But if a cybercrime treaty is to deal with "the
profound changes brought about by the digitalisa-
tion, convergence and continuing globalisation of
computer networks,"' ' 14 it needs to provide a di-
rection for procedural protections as well as the
permissions it allows. The treaty references
human rights documents that do reflect the dif-
fering problems of the information age. As one
organization succinctly said, "A great deal has
changed since 1950. If there is a need for a treaty
requiring countries to adopt certain surveillance
laws, then there is also a need for an updated in-
ternational standard on privacy protections for
government surveillance."' 15
Traditional lawmaking often emphasizes en-
forcement before privacy. If digital technologies
110 GENERAL COMMENT TO ARTICLE 17, available at http:/
/www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ (symbol) /CCPR+Gener-
alcomment+1 6.En?OpenDocument.
111 Cybercrime Treaty Draft 19, supra note 46.
112 Declan McCullagh, Privacy a Likely Loser in Treaty,
WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,40576,00.html (Dec. 7, 2000). CoE officials have ex-
pressly stated that privacy laws across Europe are too diverse
to agree upon a set standard of procedural guidelines. Yet,
the same diversity regarding computer crimes can be harmo-
nized and coordinated.
113 To allow for some credit, paragraph 148 discusses the
need for signatories to consider the public interest of propri-
etary interests and the rights and interests of third parties
when considering "the sound administration of justice." Ex-
planatory Memorandum, supra note 75. The specificity of what
is just and in the public interest is left for each country to
determine.
114 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at pream-
ble.
115 CDT Comments, supra note 50.
have caused a need to update international crimi-
nal law, then privacy protections enacted before
these technologies emerged should be equally up-
dated. The treaty must further explain and pro-
vide for procedural safeguards that protect the
public from intrusive enforcement mechanisms,
such as what constitutes excessive surveillance or
by what judicial standards should a court deter-
mine a proper police search and seizure was con-
ducted. The treaty should declare specific human
rights standards as laid out in other CoE trea-
ties.1" 6 Given the nature of digital information,
privacy rights need clarifying before international
implementation.
c. Articles 16, 17 & 18 - Expedited Preservation
of Stored Computer Data & Production Orders
The legal status of privacy is less than other
comparable rights. "Privacy can be defined as a
fundamental, though not absolute, human
right."" 7 A reading of Articles 16 through 23 adds
strength to this statement for the articles call for
international legislation of criminal procedure
laws. The procedural mandates range from per-
mitting law enforcement to search and seize com-
puter data'" to mandating that ISPs comply with
criminal investigation efforts. 19 These procedural
requirements make the safeguard provisions in
Article 15 seem like a castle made of sand.' 2
0
Articles 16 and 17 require countries to adopt
laws instructing individuals or businesses to pre-
serve data when ordered to do so by law enforce-
ment officers.' 21 For instance, ISPs allow informa-
l16 See Will Knight, Cybercrime Treaty May Conflict with UN
Declaration, ZDNET.COM, at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/
0,,t269-s2083139,00.html (Dec. 12, 2000) (reporting that civil
liberty groups have actively criticized the draft treaty for not
developing a framework more aligned with the United Na-
tions Declaration on Human Rights).
117 David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Pri-
vacy Protection: An International Survey of Privacy, Data Protec-
tion, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J. MAR.J. COM-
PUTER & INFO L. 1, 8 (1999).
118 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at art. 19.
("Search and Seizure of Stored Computer Data").
119 Id. at arts. 16-18.
120 And we all know that "castles made of sand melt into
the sea, eventually." Jimi Hendrix, Castles Made of Sand, on
Axis: BOLD As LovE (Reprise Records 1967).
121 "Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to enable its competent au-
thorities to order or similarly obtain the expeditious preser-
vation of [specified] computer data, including traffic data,
that has been stored by means of a computer system, in par-
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tion to be transferred and stored through their
services for the purposes of e-mail and user web
pages. Law enforcement officers could get a court
order forcing an ISP to preserve all data related to
any investigation. If the FBI were to examine on-
line child pornography rings, the agency could re-
quire companies such as AOL or Earthlink to pre-
serve data related to the investigation. Such data
could include bank records, credit cards or any
other various financial or informational items.
1 22
Article 16(2) specifies that an individual or bus-
iness would be required to preserve such data
transmissions for an "adequate period of time,"
presumably as long as a law enforcement investi-
gation is being conducted. 123 The article further
mandates that legislation shall be adopted to or-
der those preserving the data to keep such proce-
dures confidential. '2 4 In other words, an ISP pre-
serving data at the requirement of law enforce-
ment must do so within a certain timeframe and
must not make public any information with re-
spect to the investigation.
Article 17 goes one step further by ensuring
that data is preserved regardless of the involve-
ment of multiple service providers. 125 The article
also ensures "expeditious disclosure" to a coun-
try's "competent authority,"1126 whereby all infor-
mation would be turned over to law enforcement
ticular where there are grounds to believe that the computer
data is particularly vulnerable to loss or modification." Cyber-
crime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at art. 16(1).
122 CDT Comments, supra note 50.
This provision applies to any evidence the government
may want about any crime. It is not limited to communi-
cations. It applies to any data that has been stored in a
computer system. Thus, any business of any kind that
uses a computer can be ordered under this provision to
store any data that the government might want: Bank
records, credit card data, inventory data, invoices, word
processing, Web surfing data. A business that has a video
camera can be told to preserve the tapes. The operator
of an intelligent highway system or a passkey system can
be required to preserve the data on the comings and go-
ings of vehicles and people. Id.
123 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at art.
16(2).
Where a Party gives effect to paragraph 1 above by
means of an order to a person to preserve specified
stored computer data in the person's possession or con-
trol, the Party shall adopt such legislative and other mea-
sures as may be necessary to oblige that person to pre-
serve and maintain the integrity of that computer data
for an adequate period of time, as necessary, to enable
the competent authorities to seek its disclosure. Id.
124 "Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other mea-
sures as may be necessary to oblige the custodian or other
person who is to preserve the computer data to keep confi-
so that government officers could begin immedi-
ately tracing the transmission of data and identify-
ing all the appropriate service providers involved.
Articles 16 and 17, as worded, storm past the
fine line between criminal investigation and pri-
vacy. For example, the Internet Alliance 127 has ar-
gued that the draft treaty is at odds with the pro-
tection principles of the Data Protection Directive
of the European Union ("EU").128 This Directive
was an enactment of the EU community in Octo-
ber 1995 asserting that data processing systems
should be used to respect "fundamental rights
and freedoms, notably the right to privacy."
129
The ease of processing and exchanging data was
recognized as a fundamental threat to privacy
since technologies could readily transport infor-
mation and be susceptible to the interference of
others. The argument is that without the proper
procedural safeguards in place, a country could
use the treaty as a means to enforce government
policies unrelated to actual network intrusions,
such as the identification and location of political
dissidents. 3°1 A signatory country lacking proce-
dural limitations could target more than cyber-
criminals. A signatory could track, investigate and
seize information in the investigation of other un-
favorable policy decisions. 31 The Internet cur-
rently provides anonymity for the politically perse-
dential the undertaking of such procedures for the period of
time provided for by its domestic law." Id. at art 16(3).
125 Id. at art. 17(1)(a).
126 Id. at art. 17(1) (b) ("Each Party shall adopt such leg-
islative or other measures as may be necessary to "ensure the
expeditious disclosure to the Party's competent authority, or
a person designated by that authority, of a sufficient amount
of traffic data to enable the Party to identify the service prov-
iders and the path through which the communication was
transmitted.").
127 "The Internet Alliance (IA) is [an] organization of
Internet policy professionals representing the Internet on-
line industry on the state, federal and international levels."
INTERNET ALLIANCE, THE INTERNET ALLIANCE: WHO WE ARE,
at http://www.internetalliance.org/aboutisa/whoweare.
html.
128 INTERNET ALLIANCE, Internet Alliance Comments on
Council of Europe's Draft Convention on Cyber-Crime No. 19, at
http://www.cdt.org/international/cybercrime/
001000ia.shtml (Oct. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Internet Alliance
Comments].
129 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Indi-
viduals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281), 31 at
2, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/
1995/en_395L0046.html.
130 Internet Alliance Comments, supra note 128.
131 See AOL Removes 'Offensive' Website, REUTERS, at http://
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cuted, as many can express political and religious
beliefs safely without fear of government sanction.
Government by itself cannot regulate and en-
force. Nations need the help of those private enti-
ties that maintain the cyber architectures. Article
18 of the treaty concerns production orders and
requires countries to order persons within their
national boundaries to produce any computer
data or information under that person's con-
trol. 132 The article also mandates that ISPs submit
all subscriber information that pertains to citizens
within a particular nation's territory.1 33 The last
section of Article 18 clearly defines subscriber in-
formation as any and all information that an ISP
may possess. 13 4 This includes technical parame-
ters of a person's system, 135 personal identifiers
such as telephone numbers and billing informa-
tion 13 6 and all information relating to an ISP's ser-
vice agreement. - 7 An ISP maintains certain li-
censing requirements that retain the right to
keeping records on customer activity. In the event
of a court production order, the ISP must provide
assistance to law enforcement.
d. Article 19 through 21 - Search, Seizure and
Interception
So far, this paper has established that law en-
www.abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/DailyNews/
aol-site980624.html (June 24, 1998). AOL closed down one
of its websites that parodied the Koran and other Islamic cus-
toms. The country of Egypt protested, stating that the site was
offensive to Muslims.
132 Cybercime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at art.
18(1) ("Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to empower its competent au-
thorities to order: (a) a person in its territory to submit speci-
fied computer data under this person's control, which is
stored in a computer system or a computer-data storage me-
dium.").
133 Id. at art. 18(1) ("Each Party shall adopt such legisla-
tive and other measures as may be necessary to empower its
competent authorities to order: (b) a service provider offer-
ing its services in its territory to submit subscriber informa-
tion under that service provider's possession or control.").
134 Id. at art. 18(3) ("For the purpose of this article, 'sub-
scriber information' means any information, contained in
the form of computer data or any other form, that is held by
a service provider, relating to users of its service, other than
traffic or content data.").
135 Id. at art. 18(3)(i) ("[T]he type of the communica-
tion service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and
the period of service.").
136 Id. at art. 18(3)(ii) ("[T]he user's identity, postal or
geographic address, telephone and other access number,
billing and payment information, available on the basis of
the service agreement or arrangement.").
forcement may, and will, be able to preserve
stored computer data and force ISPs to submit to
the authorities all information regarding their
customers. Three more articles also intrude upon
privacy by allowing law enforcement and ISPs to
gather and collect information on suspected
cyber offenses.
Articles 19 through 21 are the heart and soul of
the treaty enforcement provisions. These articles
allow for the search and seizure of stored com-
puter data,138 the collection and recording of
computer traffic 39 and the interception of con-
tent data.140 These articles develop procedural
standards for law enforcement that increase com-
munications monitoring without increasing pri-
vacy protections.
Article 19 reflects traditional search and seizure
laws. A signatory must enact legislation that would
allow law enforcement officials the ability to ac-
cess any information within its territory.14 1 If it is
suspected that the same information lies on multi-
ple computer systems, the draft treaty allows those
systems likewise to be searched and seized.' 42 The
search and seizure ability includes the power to
secure a computer system,143 retain copies of any
data information, 44 maintain the data so that it is
not altered 145 and block accessibility or remove
the data entirely.'
46
137 Id. at art. 18(3) (iii) ("[Any other information on the
site of the installation of communication equipment availa-
ble on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement.").
138 Id. at art. 19.
]39 Id. at art. 20.
140 Id. at art. 21.
141 Id. at art. 19(1) ("Each Party shall adopt such legisla-
tive and other measures as may be necessary to empower its
competent authorities to search or similarly access: (a) a
computer system or part of it and computer data stored
therein; and (b) computer-data storage medium in which
computer data may be stored, in its territory.").
142 Id. at art. 19(2) ("Each Party shall adopt such legisla_-.
tive and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that
where its authorities search or similarly access a specific com-
puter system or part of it, pursuant to paragraph 1(a), and
have grounds to believe that the data sought is stored in an-
other computer system or part of it in its territory, and such
data is lawfully accessible from or available to the initial sys-
tem, such authorities shall be able to expeditiously extend
the search or similar accessing to the other system.").
143 Id. at art. 19(2) (a) ("These measures shall include
the power to (a) seize or similarly secure a computer system
or part of it or a computer-data storage medium.").
144 Id. at art. 19(2) (b) ("make and retain a copy of those
computer data").
145 Id. at 19(2)(c) ("maintain the integrity of the rele-
vant stored computer data").
146 Id. at 19(2) (c) ("render inaccessible or remove those
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Article 19 specifies how law enforcement may
monitor data transmissions, but it leaves open
possibilities for cumbersome intrusion into per-
sonal lives and business operations. 147 The draft
treaty does not issue any constraining standards
upon law enforcement. A suggestion would be to
add a footnote explaining these standards so that
businesses and individuals are not intruded upon
unnecessarily. 14
8
As previously noted, Articles 20 and 21 provide
for domestic laws that allow law enforcement to
monitor, collect and intercept data transmissions.
These articles are analogous to wiretapping and
surveillance procedures that are already used by
law enforcement. 1 49 Article 20 provides that signa-
tories empower their enforcement authorities to
collect and record traffic data through "technical
means." 150 Traffic data is defined under Article 1
as "any computer data relating to a communica-
tion by means of a computer system, generated by
the computer system that formed a part in the
chain of communication, indicating the commu-
nication's origin, destination, route, time, date,
size, duration or type of underlying [network] ser-
vice." 151 This appears to be an all-encompassing
definition.
Article 21 is similar in that authorities will have
the same powers over content data, as well as traf-
fic data. 15 2 The two articles are virtually identical
besides their different references to types of data.
The treaty does not differentiate between the two
types of data, for it fails to define what "content
data" is. The term "content data" implies that it is
a subset of "traffic data." Countries that outlaw
the transmission or display of certain forms of
computer data in the accessed computer system").
147 CDT Comments, supra note 50.
148 Id. CDT argues that a government without restraint
may shut down an ISP or web portal that contains any "seize-
able" records. Id.
149 See Herman Schwartz, The Legitimization of Electronic
Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REV.
455 (1969) (outlining an early critique of electronic monitor-
ing).
150 Cybercrime Treaty Final Draft, supra note 47, at art.
20(1) (a) ("Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to empower its competent au-
thorities to (a) collect or record through application of tech-
nical means on the territory of that Party.").
151 Id. at art. 1(d).
152 Id. at art. 21(1) ("Each Party shall adopt such legisla-
tive and other measures as may be necessary, in relation to a
range of serious offences to be determined by domestic law,
content, such as hate speech, 53 would have a spe-
cific article to empower the interception of such
transmissions. In addition, nothing in the treaty
states why "content data" differs from "traffic
data" and why it requires its own separate article,
even though the language of the two articles are
the same. A clear definition of "content data" is
needed so that it can be differentiated from "traf-
fic data" so that law enforcement has access to
specific guidelines when intercepting or record-
ing data transmissions.
5 4
The linguistic problems of Articles 20 and 21
appear small, but when law enforcement is given
significant surveillance and interception powers
without being given sufficient guidelines concern-
ing the intrusiveness of these powers, then defini-
tional arguments are key. Definitions are funda-
mental, for the law uses definitions to separate is-
sues of fact from issues of law.1 55 One cannot le-
gally state that content data is of the type that law
enforcement may have power over if one does not
know what content data is. And more importantly,
if one cannot define the item that one has power
over, then power becomes more centralized and
general and abuse becomes harder to temper.
Summarily, Articles 19 through 21 threaten pri-
vacy because they lack specific guidelines as to the
limits of interception and monitoring. Terms like
"traffic data" suggest that all data may be inter-
cepted so long as the purpose is to investigate
cybercrime. Terms without definitions simply lack
credibility for they are vague, over-empowering
and do not provide a bright line between issues of
fact and issues of law.
to empower its competent authorities to (a) collect or record
through application of technical means on the territory of
that Party . . . [of] content data, in real-time, of specified
communications in its territory transmitted by means of a
computer system.").
153 France, Germany and Austria all have laws restricting
hate speech and any display of such, especially that relating
to the Holocaust. See Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affir-
mation or Contradiction of Freedom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 789, 801 (1996); Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and
the First Amendment: The Quest for Truth in a Free Society, 6 CEo.
MASON L. REV. 35, 72, n. 286 (1997).
154 See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, supra note 50 (ar-
guing for more precise definitions of what constitutes "con-
tent data" and "traffic data").




IV. CONCLUSION: THE DRAFT TREATY
CANNOT BE SIGNED
Lawrence Lessig states "that there is a decision
to be made about the architecture that cyberspace
will become, and the question is how that decision
will be made. Or better, where will the decision be
made."15 6 This question is being answered all too
quickly, and the resounding response is being met
with widespread difficulty. Government officials
are concerned with the threats of cybercrime and
the rising costs of investigation.' 57 Privacy is not a
strong concern.
The chairman of the PC-CY has baldly asserted,
"We cannot find an acceptable international stan-
dard in terms of privacy as it applies to this
156 Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REv. 1403, 1411 (1996) (posing several questions about the
current unregulation of cyberspace and what the potential
bordering of cyberspace may become).
157 Freeh Statement on Cybercrime, supra note 7.
158 Declan McCullagh & Nicholas Morehead, Privacy a
Likely Loser in Treaty, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/
news/print/0,1294,40576,00.html (Dec. 7, 2000) (quoting
Henrik Kaspersen of the Council of Europe and chair of PC-
CY stated at a panel debate hosted by McConnell Interna-
treaty.' 58 In other words, European privacy laws
are so diverse that a common ground upon which
to agree is difficult. The cybercrime treaty was first
implemented because the cyber laws across Eu-
rope are so different.
Without specific protections for privacy rights,
nations may well enforce new standards of en-
forcement with little concern for outdated stan-
dards on privacy. The Council of Europe and the
Department of Justice need to clarify the vague
items that remain.' 59 Although the U.S. has
signed the treaty as written, it has not ratified the
treaty into law and should not do so without fur-
ther revision.
tional). Henrik Kaspersen has stated that those protesting
the treaty either are American lawyers who do not under-
stand European law or "Internet users." It can be assumed
that this reference to "Internet users" may mean those peo-
ple who use sophisticated communications but have sub-par
understanding of international issues. This is an interesting
comment from a party that is receiving tremendous legal ad-
vice from the U.S. DOJ.
159 The DOJ needs to also explain the treaty's impact on
U.S. law.
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